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‘THE ADMIXTURE OF FEMININE WEAKNESS AND 
SUSCEPTIBILITY’: GENDERED PERSONIFICATIONS OF 
THE STATE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Gendered Personifications of the State 
AOIFE O’DONOGHUE* 
19th century international law textbooks were infused with the gendered personification of states. 
Legal academics, such as Johann Casper Bluntschli, John Westlake, Robert Phillimore and 
James Lorimer, relied on gendered personification to ascribe attributes to states. Masculine 
states, reasonable, bounded and strong, were the backbone of Western civilisation, while 
feminine states were irrational, permeable and lacking in the reasonability necessary for full 
statehood. Britannia may have represented the British Empire at its zenith but the allegory was 
not intended as a rallying call for women’s political participation. John Bull represented the 
actuality of citizenship. Recent scholarship recognises the import of 19th century international 
legal academia to contemporary law. This article argues that the personifications, which 
suffused the writings of these authors, set the terms in which contemporary international law 
understands statehood. Explicitly gendered language may no longer be invoked but the terms of 
statehood remain sexed. When scholars return to the writings of 19th century international legal 
academia, attention to the negative gendered bequests of the era is required. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
The State, as the nation, consciously determining and governing itself, cannot 
afford to weaken its manly character by the admixture of feminine weakness and 
susceptibility.1 
Personification of states reached its apex in the 19th century. Britannia ruled 
the waves, Marianne sustained the French Republic and ‘feminine’ peoples, due 
to their lack of reason or rationality, had limited chances of statehood. Equally, 
masculine states, from John Bull to Der Deutsche Michel, overflowing with 
order, rationalism and bordered nationalism, epitomised the height of European 
civilisation. Contemporaneously, the first modern academic international lawyers 
consolidated the field into its modern form. These academic brethren established 
the first international legal societies, journals and international law textbooks. 
Texts, in a break from their antecedents, were produced from the view of the 
                                                 
 * Professor, Durham University Law School. My thanks to Máiréad Enright, Dara Downey, 
Henry Jones, Colin Murray and Ruth Houghton for comments on earlier drafts. All errors 
are my own. 
 1 Johann Caspar Bluntschli, The Theory of the State (Clarendon Press, 1885) 193. 
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homo academicus.2 Used as part of international law courses into the next 
century these texts formed the basis on which many of those who would shape 
the first half of 20th century international law learned its form and structure. They 
set the template for modern international law textbooks,3 and are replete with 
gendered personifications of states. This article first queries the intentions of 
these authors in utilising personification. Second, it examines their enduring 
influence. Finally, it argues for caution in invocations of this era as a progressive 
pivot around which modern international law emerged. 
‘The State is humanity organised, but humanity as masculine, not as feminine: 
the State is the man’.4 Personification is not always as blatant as this quote from 
Johann Casper Bluntschli but at its core it is the attribution of human qualities to 
inanimate objects, animals and, of particular import here, abstract legal and 
political forms. Personification builds upon metaphor where the latter is ‘an 
additive, and not substitutive instrument of knowledge’.5 Long personified as 
Justitia or Themis, Justice as a Greek mythological woman resplendent in her 
robes is familiar to all who work within law. Yet, as Marina Warner argues, 
invocations of the female form are not emblematic of female empowerment nor 
perceived female acumen for legal practice. Instead, these allegorical forms 
depend ‘on the unlikelihood of women practising the concepts they represent’.6 
In contrast, a male figure as Justice is an active figure to be imitated. Male 
personifications of law adopt a specific commanding attitude, such as the 
‘Authority of Law’, a male figure who accompanies Justice at the front of the 
United States Supreme Court.7 
The choice of 19th century authors rests upon several premises. First, as Mark 
Mazower explains, it is the era in which global governance based around a semi-
legal fulcrum takes shape.8 Second, and related to this, legal academics 
possessed an opportunity to define modern international law, by moving it 
                                                 
 2 Pierre Bourdieu, Homo Academicus (Peter Collier trans, Stanford University Press, first 
published 1984, 1988 ed). 
 3 Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International 
Law 1870–1960 (Cambridge University Press, 2001) 2–3.  
 4 Bluntschli, above n 1, 32. 
 5 Umberto Eco and Christopher Paci, ‘The Scandal of Metaphor: Metaphorology and 
Semiotics’ (1983) 4 Poetics Today 217, 219 (emphasis in original). 
 6 Marina Warner, Monuments and Maidens: The Allegory of the Female Form (Pan Books, 
1987) xx. French Prime Minister Manuel Valls’ invocation of the image of bare breasted 
Marianne as representative of ideals of French statehood in repudiation of the Birkini was 
not intended as a command that ‘real’ French women should go bare breasted. The allegory 
was invoked to create otherness rather than as a model of action: see Angelique Chrisafis, 
‘French PM Suggests Naked Breasts Represent France Better than a Headscarf’, The 
Guardian (online), 30 August 2016 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/30/france-manuel-valls-breasts-headscarf-
burkini-ban-row> archived at <https://perma.cc/VX7C-LVMD>. 
 7 The statue is described by the artist, James Earle Fraser, as ‘powerful, erect, and vigilant. He 
waits with concentrated attention, holding in his left hand the tablet of laws, backed by the 
sheathed sword, symbolic of enforcement through law’. Quoted in Office of the Curator, 
‘Statues of Contemplation of Justice and Authority of Law’ (Information Sheet, Supreme 
Court of the United States, 25 May 2010) 
<https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/FraserStatuesInfoSheet.pdf> archived at 
<https://perma.cc/X68X-WM6W>. Other examples of male personification of Justice 
include ‘The Majesty of Justice’ who is also accompanied by ‘The Spirit of Justice’, a 
female figure of Lady Justice in the US Department of Justice. 
 8 Mark Mazower, Governing the World: The History of an Idea (Allen Lane, 2012) 65–94. 
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beyond Hugo Grotius and Emer de Vattel and making it relevant to the new era 
of imperialism and the nation state. Third, their texts became the basis on which 
those who would author the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Statute of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice and the 1907–08 Hague Conventions 
and other key 20th century international law documents learned their craft. 
Fourth, and finally, examinations of this era by John Anthony Carty in the 1970s 
and more recently Antony Anghie, David Kennedy, Martti Koskenniemi, Anne 
Orford and Alexander Orakhelashvili reveal how 19th century authors established 
some of international legal academia’s longstanding traditions.9 This article 
builds upon their critique of 19th century writers by challenging the recent 
valorisation of some of these figures and the lack of explicit recognition of the 
misogyny that stands alongside the racism and imperialism in these texts. It is in 
the 19th century that international law’s contemporary structure and language 
were established and the authors of this period remain the touchstone figures of 
today. 
Perhaps this endeavour is anachronistic. But, as Orford maintains, the claim 
‘that international lawyers should not study the movement of concepts across 
time raises serious problems in relation to meaning and understanding in 
international law’.10 For instance, it shuts down critical approaches including 
Third World Approaches to International Law (‘TWAIL’) and feminist analysis. 
Given the specific status afforded to international legal writing within 
international law, the reliance on past authors requires us to look not only at the 
contemporaneous context of their writing but also their reception over time.11 
Karen Knop argues that contemporary personification of the state exposes 
international legal norms as male, but little work has been done to trace its 
inculcation into international law textbooks by their originators.12 Work on the 
continued influence of 19th century authors has become more commonplace; in 
particular, the work of Koskenniemi in The Gentle Civiliser of Nations: The Rise 
and Fall of International Law 1870–1960 (‘The Gentle Civiliser of Nations’) 
presents a hagiographic view of the men of this era.13 
States would take time to follow the aspirations of Bluntschli and his fellow 
writers, but the modern international legal discipline emerged in the 19th century. 
The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (‘Montevideo 
                                                 
 9 Koskenniemi, above n 3, 3; Anne Orford, ‘The Past as Law or History? The Relevance of 
Imperialism for Modern International Law’ in Mark Toufayan, Emmanuelle Tourme-
Jouannet and Hélène Ruiz Fabri (eds), Droit international et nouvelles approaches sur le 
tiers-monde: Entre répétition et renouveau (Société de Législation Comparée, 2013) 97, 
106–7; Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘The 19th-Century Life of International Law’ in 
Alexander Orakhelashvili (ed), Research Handbook on the Theory and History of 
International Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011) 441; David Kennedy, ‘International 
Law and the Nineteenth Century: History of an Illusion’ (1996) 65 Nordic Journal of 
International Law 385; John Anthony Carty, 19th Century International Textbooks (PhD 
Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1972); Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the 
Making of International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
 10 Anne Orford, ‘International Law and the Limits of History’ in Wouter Werner, Alexis 
Galán, and Marieke de Hoon (eds), The Law of International Lawyers: Reading Martti 
Koskenniemi (Cambridge University Press, 2017) 297, 304. 
 11 Ibid. 
 12 Karen Knop, ‘Re/Statements: Feminism and State Sovereignty in International Law’ (1993) 
3 Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 293, 295.  
 13 Koskenniemi, above n 3. 
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Convention’) set the template for contemporary statehood,14 but it did not 
emerge in a vacuum. Rather, it was framed by those who learned their law from 
19th century textbooks.15 Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin highlight 
how the Montevideo Convention’s criteria affirmed a test of statehood that, in its 
constituent elements, negatively impacts on the advancement of women’s rights, 
continues the dominance of the public–private divide and influences our ideas of 
governance and control.16 This article does not repeat this effort by examining 
the definition of statehood but rather demonstrates that gendered language and 
personification were an integral part of 19th century textbooks and, due to the 
continued influence described by Koskenniemi and others, our modern 
understanding of statehood. 
In scrutinising personification, we must look beyond law to wider 
understandings of the personified state. This article examines personification and 
its use as a persuasive tool in literature before turning to the 19th century texts 
and the implications of gendering the state. The article examines the 
contemporary implications of state personification and the shadow that these 
authors cast within legal academia.17 Charlesworth argues that ‘little attention 
has been given to the sex attached to the notion of statehood … [yet] the 
character of the central person in international law, the nation state, rests on 
particular beliefs about sexual difference’.18 This article argues that we must 
focus on how 19th century international legal academics inculcated this 
difference into international law and asks what this means for our contemporary 
understanding of the role of gender within international law. ‘Modern law has 
much at stake in maintaining these boundaries: between male and female, inside 
and outside, law and violence, civilization and savagery’.19 
This articles charts for the first time the explicit gendering of the state in 19th 
century texts, arguing that this ought to impact on how we perceive the 
academics of this era and their authoring of the modern discipline. Establishing 
the importance of metaphor and personification to rhetoric by looking at the 
debate within English, the piece also explores their fixed place within law and 
international legal discourse. The piece reveals the extent to which 19th century 
international legal texts, all of which are still cited, make use of personification 
as part of an explicitly interlinked misogynist and racist discourse, often for the 
purpose of imperialism, but also for the purposes of a domestic audience, and 
places those debates within their broader political and historical context. The 
piece then turns to the contemporary era to demonstrate both the ongoing use and 
extolling of these authors alongside the enduring use of gendered language. The 
                                                 
 14 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, signed 26 December 1933, 135 
LNTS 19 (entered into force 26 December 1934) art 1. 
 15 Thomas D Grant, ‘Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and Its Discontents’ 
(1999) 37 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 403, 416–17. 
 16 Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law: A 
Feminist Analysis (Manchester University Press, 2000) 124–70.  
 17 Knop, above n 12, 294. 
 18 Hilary Charlesworth, ‘The Sex of the State in International Law’ in Ngaire Naffine and 
Rosemary J Owens (eds), Sexing the Subject of Law (LBC Information Services, 1997) 251, 
253. 
 19 Ruth Buchanan and Rebecca Johnson, ‘The ‘Unforgiven’ Sources of International Law: 
Nation-building, Violence, and Gender in the West(ern)’ in Doris Buss and Ambreena 
Manji (eds), International Law: Modern Feminist Approaches (Hart, 2004) 131, 133. 
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article argues that more vigilance is necessary when lauding the virtues of the 
19th century legal academia and calls for a halt to the gendered personification of 
the state. 
II METAPHOR AND PERSONIFICATION 
Personification … the rhetorical figure by which something not human is given a 
human identity or ‘face’, is readily spotted, but the figure’s cognitive form and 
function, its rhetorical and pictorial effects, rarely elicit scholarly attention. As a 
communicative device it is either taken for granted or dismissed as mere 
convention.20 
At the heart of this article are personification and metaphor. Significantly and 
intimately linked within language, thought and philosophy across several 
disciplines must be considered in tandem.21 Umberto Eco and Christopher Paci 
propose that metaphor is  
[t]he ‘most luminous, and therefore the most necessary and frequent’ … of all 
tropes, the metaphor, defies every encyclopaedic entry. Above all because it has 
been the object of philosophical, linguistic, aesthetic and psychological reflection 
since the beginning of time.22  
Metaphor exists everywhere we use language (and other communicative 
forms). For James Greensough and George Kittredge ‘[l]anguage is fossil poetry 
… Our commonest words are worn-out metaphors’.23 Within philosophy, 
metaphor is regarded as the site of language’s birth.24 Jacques Derrida considers 
metaphor and figurative language as inextricably linked to philosophy, arguing 
that figurative representation is at the heart of linguistic constructions.25 Such 
representations signify the relationship between constructing ideas and 
representing them in language. The centrality of metaphor and figurative 
language to communication has intensified the contestation of these forms.26 
Rather than attempting to encapsulate this debate, this section focuses on the 
                                                 
 20 Walter S Melion and Bart Ramakers, ‘Personification: An Introduction’ in Walter S Melion 
and Bart Ramakers (eds), Personification: Embodying Meaning and Emotion (Brill, 2016) 
1. 
 21 James J Paxson, The Poetics of Personification (Cambridge University Press, 1994) 8. 
 22 Eco and Paci, above n 5, 217 (citations omitted). 
 23 James B Greenough and George L Kittredge, Words and Their Ways in English Speech 
(MacMillian, 1929) 11. 
 24 Max Black, Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy (Cornell 
University Press, 1962); Warren A Shibles, Metaphor: An Annotated Bibliography and 
History (Language Press, 1971); Aristotle, Poetics (Malcolm Heath trans, Penguin Classics, 
1996); Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Origin of Language (John H Moran and Alexander 
Gode trans, University of Chicago Press, 1986) [trans of: Essai sur l’origine des langues 
(first published 1762)]; Quintilian, The Orator’s Education (Donald A Russell trans, 
Harvard University Press, 2001). 
 25 Jacques Derrida and F C T Moore, ‘White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy’ 
(1974) 6 New Literary History 5, 7.  
 26 For instance, for a semantic and pragmatic twist alongside comparativist and brute force 
accounts of metaphor, see David Hills, ‘Metaphor’ in Edward N Zalta (ed), The Stanford 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Stanford University, Winter 2012 revised ed, 2011) 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/metaphor/>. See also Michel Foucault, 
The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (Routledge, 2005) [trans of: 
Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines (first published 1966)]. 
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aims behind the invocation of metaphor and personification and evaluates what 
its usage may mean for law. 
Amongst the multiple accounts of metaphor’s use there is a shared 
understanding that its underlying rationale is to communicate a specific 
impression to the observer. This impression requires the observer to contemplate, 
besides the original object, a supplementary meaning.27 Metaphors consider two 
things at once: the subject of the discussion and the subject of the metaphor. The 
former is likened to the latter, ‘inviting our listener to register the parallelism and 
ponder its significance’.28 Although a chosen metaphor may not be like the 
object under consideration in any physical or theoretical form, the metaphor 
operates by utilising resemblance or equivalence.29 Metaphors can also obfuscate 
by making a comment, either positive or negative, about an object without 
declaring that opinion outright. As Gérard Genette argues, they introduce ‘a 
sense of figure … [whose] existence depends completely on the awareness that 
the reader has, or does not have of the ambiguity of the discourse that is being 
offered’.30 
In the political context metaphors offer  
a unique cognitive function quite different from the logical function of abstract 
concepts … metaphors operate through the associative powers of the imagination, 
and, in order to communicate ideas persuasively, they exploit the resources of 
conceptual development …31  
Giuseppa Saccarco-Battisti suggests that personification goes beyond 
metaphor to elicit a specific response from the audience.32 Metaphor explicates 
while personification intends the audience to have a particular reaction to that 
object and to act in a particular way towards it. Personification possesses a 
mnemonic function by creating an artificial memory that links the personified 
object with other spaces or constructs.33 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson use 
inflation to illustrate this point: 
Inflation has attacked the foundation of our economy … but the metaphor is not 
merely INFLATION IS A PERSON. It is much more specific, namely, 
INFLATION IS AN ADVERSARY. It not only gives us a very specific way of 
thinking about inflation but also a way of acting toward it. We think of inflation 
as an adversary that can attack us, hurt us, steal from us, even destroy us. The 
INFLATION IS AN ADVERSARY metaphor therefore gives rise to and justifies 
political and economic actions on the part of our government: declaring war on 
                                                 
 27 Eco and Paci, above n 5, 221. 
 28 Hills, above n 26. 
 29 Ibid. 
 30 Gérard Genette, Figures of Literary Discourse (Alan Sheridan trans, Columbia University 
Press, 1982) 54. This is somewhat different to figures that reinforce existing ideas that a 
reader may have about a subject. See Elaine Freedgood, The Ideas in Things: Fugitive 
Meaning in the Victorian Novel (University of Chicago Press, 2010) 2–4. 
 31 Giuseppa Saccaro-Battisti, ‘Changing Metaphors of Political Structures’ (1983) 44 Journal 
of the History of Ideas 31, 31 (citations omitted). 
 32 Ibid 35. 
 33 Genette, above n 30. 
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inflation, setting targets, calling for sacrifices, installing a new chain of command, 
etc.34 
The ubiquity of personification is such that often we do not recognise it or 
ponder its principally feminine nature and what, in particular, giving the object 
stereotypical feminine characteristics achieves.35 In giving the subject human 
characteristics, such as an implied binary quality of gender, the author is 
attempting to make us understand the subject in familiar terms and associate with 
those attributes. It relies both on common knowledge and the existence of 
stereotypes within a society and our reaction to those stereotypes. This 
personification’s mission belies suggestions that we sometimes assign feminised 
or masculinised characteristics to sexless objects without an underlying intent to 
influence the reader to consider that object from a gendered perspective. Rather, 
as personification intends to make us think about an object in a particular way, to 
influence our thoughts, it is a significant tool of language and persuasion. 
Use of the female or male to personify states dates from the pre-modern 
period.36 Into the 17th and 18th centuries the embodiment of the continents and 
the emergent modern state as gendered became more frequent.37 Personifying the 
state as male or female is an attempt to not only represent something we are 
familiar with, but also to grant specific attributes to those states.38 
Nation-as-woman expresses a spatial, embodied femaleness: the land’s fecundity 
must be protected against invasion and violation. It is also a temporal metaphor: 
the rape of the body/nation not only violates frontiers but disrupts — by planting 
alien seed or destroying reproductive viability …39 
Gendered personification relies on socially constructed behaviours, activities 
and attributes of being male or female rather than a set of physical factors to 
determine sex.40 While the binarity of these divisions is complicated by the 
fluidity of some states who could possess both male and female genders at the 
same time, the socialised construction of both is essential to understanding their 
coexistence. Sexing a state takes on its gendered character by the process of 
personification. 
                                                 
 34 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (University of Chicago Press, 
2003) 33–4. 
 35 Ernst H Gombrich, ‘Personification’ in R R Bolgar (ed), Classical Influences on European 
Culture AD 500–1500 (Cambridge University Press, 1971) 248. 
 36 Bart Ramakers, ‘Lady World in Rhetoricians’ Drama’ in Walter S Melion and Bart 
Ramakers, Personification: Embodying Meaning and Emotion (Brill, 2016) 287. 
 37 Shirley Samuels, Romances of the Republic: Women, the Family, and Violence in the 
Literature of the Early American Nation (Oxford University Press, 1996) 3–8. 
 38 The low frequency of the use of political metaphors in utopias and science fiction may 
suggest that such rhetorical devices have seldom been considered adequate or appropriate to 
depict new, more complicated and imaginary societies. See Saccaro-Battisti, above n 31, 32. 
 39 V Spike Peterson, ‘The Intended and Unintended Queering of States/Nations’ (2013) 13 
Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 57, 62 (emphasis in original).  
 40 Mary Anne C Case, ‘Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The 
Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence’ (1995) 105 Yale Law Journal 1, 2–
3; Myra J Hird, ‘Gender’s Nature: Intersexuality, Transsexualism and the “Sex”/“Gender” 
Binary’ (2000) 1 Feminist Theory 347; Francisco Valdes, ‘Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and 
Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of “Sex”, “Gender”, and “Sexual Orientation” in 
Euro-American Law and Society’ (1995) 83 California Law Review 1.  
8 Melbourne Journal of International Law [Vol 19 
During this period emphasis on the female form came in two varieties; first, 
as embodying weakness, childishness and emotionality41 and second, as mythical 
allegorical figures such as Britannia, Marianne or Hibernia. Warner in 
Monuments and Maidens: The Allegory of the Female Form describes female 
personification as a tool to ‘lure, to delight, to appetize, to please, these confer 
the power to persuade: as the spur to desire, as the excitement of the senses, as 
the weapon of delight’.42 Warner is clear that portrayals of Britannia or Justice as 
armoured womanly figures are not intended as ideals or aspirational forms for 
women. Personification in this form confines women ‘to the world of metaphor 
rather than active participation’.43 By their nature mythical personifications were 
apart from the everyday female form, which in the Victorian era was weak, 
childish, irrational and low.44 Personification aims to make us regard an object in 
a particular manner. In doing so, distinct traits are ascribed; the mythical allegory 
of the female state was not intended to bear any relation to the political and often 
masculinised calls to enter politics. Instead, real women were confined to the 
private non-political sphere, where their emotional nature prevented them from 
governing. Personification of states is not static; states’ genders are fluid 
depending on the aim of the writer. An allegorical state can be personified as 
female whilst its political governance is male, so England can be both Britannia 
and John Bull. This paper now turns to ask what impact the admixture of 
personification and law has on our understandings of legal form. 
III LAW AND PERSONIFICATION 
Law utilises personification in a wide variety of contexts. Harold Berman 
describes how metaphor is at the core of common legal language.  
The defendant, by refusing to pay, broke his contract’ — conveying the idea of 
financial default in terms of a violent act, a breaking. The implication is that the 
defendant ought to repair the contract, either put it together again or pay its 
value.45  
Legal language evolves through analogy (specifically metaphor and 
metonymy) by substituting meanings on the basis of similarity.46 This process 
enables legal terms to expand but also sets their limits. In The Common Law, 
Oliver Wendell Holmes suggests that personification is necessary to understand 
law (in this case admiralty) as ‘only by supposing the ship to have been … 
endowed with personality, that the arbitrary seeming peculiarities of the 
                                                 
 41 Heather A Hughes, ‘The Four Continents in Seventeenth-Century Embroidery and the 
Making of English Femininity’ in Walter S Melion and Bart Ramakers, Personification: 
Embodying Meaning and Emotion (Brill, 2016) 736.  
 42 Warner, above n 6, xx. 
 43 Browen Walter, ‘Irishness, Gender, and Place’ (1995) 13 Environment and Planning D: 
Society and Space 35, 37. 
 44 Warner, above n 6, 55. 
 45 Harold J Berman, Law and Language: Effective Symbols of Community (Cambridge 
University Press, 2013) 96.  
 46 Ibid 99. 
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maritime law can be made intelligible, and on that supposition they at once 
became consistent and logical’.47 
Ngaire Naffine considers law’s relationship with personification and 
personhood as central to legal language: 
Certain analytical jurists posit a technical definition of law’s person; they insist 
that the person is pure, legal artifice, and have little time for philosophical 
speculation. The legal concept of person, they affirm, does not and should not 
depend on metaphysical presuppositions about persons. In reply, it will be said 
that lawyers are unable to avoid speculation about what it is to be a person: the 
legal term is constantly contaminated by non-legal moral meanings and may even 
be unintelligible without them.48 
Law necessarily draws toward personification and personhood. While Naffine 
does not address international law, she reveals how ubiquitous such practices are, 
arguing that these techniques trick us into thinking legal persons are something 
more than ‘pure abstraction of law’ and tied to wider societal perceptions.49 
Personification works when it operates in conjunction with prevailing 
conventions. These conventions fill what would otherwise be a person devoid of 
characteristics with a distinct set of attributes that law recognises. 
International law explicitly engages with both personhood and international 
personality, often utilising gender in times of invasion or economic crises.50 
Other characteristics also play a role in our perceptions and this focus on gender 
does not exclude these other narratives, but rather, as Charlesworth argues, 
‘locating the mechanisms by which international law sexes the state, so that the 
state cannot be plausibly presented as an abstract, neutral subject’ is critical to 
understanding what law attempts to do in these circumstances.51 The admixture 
of statehood and gender became entrenched under the Montevideo Convention 
and its constituent elements still negatively impact women.52 But this particular 
admixture became entrenched in the 19th century as the next section describes. 
                                                 
 47 Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, The Common Law (Dover Publications, 1881) 27. For a history 
of maritime personification in law, see George K Walker, ‘The Personification of the Vessel 
in United States Civil in Rem Actions and the International Law Context’ (1991) 15 Tulane 
Maritime Law Journal 177. 
 48 Ngaire Naffine, ‘Who Are Law’s Persons? From Cheshire Cats to Responsible Subjects’ 
(2003) 66 Modern Law Review 346, 349. See, eg, Suzanna Sherry, ‘States Are People Too’ 
(2000) 75 Notre Dame Law Review 1121; Gregory A Mark, ‘The Personification of the 
Business Corporation in American Law’ (1987) 54 University of Chicago Law Review 1441, 
1441; Charlesworth, above n 18; M Moran, Rethinking the Reasonable Person (Oxford 
University Press, 2003). 
 49 Naffine, above n 48, 353, 356. See also Ngaire Naffine, ‘Can Women be Legal Persons?’ in 
S James and S Palmer (eds), Visible Women (Hart Publishing, 2002) 69; Ngaire Naffine, 
Law’s Meaning of Life: Philosophy, Religion, Darwin and the Legal Person (Hart 
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IV 19TH CENTURY INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS 
Though for today’s academics the 19th century seems distant it remains 
important.53 Koskenniemi, in The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, maintains that ‘a 
small number of intellectual assumptions and emotional dispositions’ of 19th 
century academics retain a surprising hold on international law describing these 
men as members of a ‘[r]omantic [p]rofession’.54 Orakhelashvili posits that in 
this era the quasi-legal and semi-constitutional normative structure of 
international law gained acceptance.55 Over the past two decades an ever-
increasing insistence of the continued relevance and impact of 19th century 
scholars on both the international legal profession and international law itself 
emerged.56 Some scholarship is both critical and self-reflective. Anghie, B S 
Chimni and Orford raise doubts by documenting the racist and imperial character 
of these texts,57 but others treat these authors with undue reverence. International 
law no longer engages in explicitly racist characterisations, yet the impact of its 
imperialist heritage continues to resonate, such that apparently neutral terms of 
engagement, including how we categorise states and their motives, echo and 
repeat the vestiges of 19th century imperialism.58 This argument is just as valid 
when we regard the gendered and misogynist language of that era. 
This section focuses on Bluntschli, James Lorimer, Robert Phillimore and 
John Westlake, amongst others.59 A Euro-American centric group typical of its 
time, these authors represent a spectrum of political and philosophical 
perspectives and all were influential in both developing international law and 
academia.60 Choice of language and structural forms were central to the 
modernisation of international law. While Orakelashvili argues that certain 
authors such as Lorimer bordered on racism, and Koskenniemi describes the 
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language as ‘striking’,61 both accounts underplay blatantly racist and misogynist 
language. Such language was neither inevitable nor can it be passed off as 
contextual to the time.62 Before turning to that discussion, it is important to look 
to the texts themselves. 
In this era, the personification of the state was not hidden, it was blatant: 
The manly character of the State. The State, as the nation, consciously 
determining and governing itself, cannot afford to weaken its manly character by 
the admixture of feminine weakness and susceptibility … The great danger, that 
political struggles would become more passionate and less amenable to the 
guidance of reason. The State would suffer if its passive elements were thus 
increased, and the active diminished … Hence, while we may tolerate such 
exceptions as female succession to the throne, which in favourable circumstances 
and in a civilised country may do no harm, it would be disastrous to bestow 
political rights on women more generally.63 
Bluntschli typifies this era’s mélange of ideas meshed together to depict the 
state. First, there is the character of the state, its attributes as self-governing and 
active, second, the dangers of feminine characteristics, third, the calamity of 
actual female governance and fourth, the disastrous consequences which would 
flow for the integrity of the Westphalian state should women be enfranchised. A 
clear view of what is masculine and what is feminine and the latter’s 
unsuitability to either governance or political rights emerges. Also evident is the 
link between civilisation and masculine states. The degree to which feminised 
governance would lead to the disintegration of states is evident. The 
reasonability of the masculinised state enables it to hold together even when 
civilisation is in doubt, an attribute which could be undermined by the presence 
of women as constituents or constituted power holders. That non-civilised states 
in particular were at risk from feminised governance structures was played out in 
various imperial undertakings. For example, in Nauru, German colonisers 
removed women from the governance structure of the island.64 British colonisers 
imposed a patriarchal order upon the Igbo in what is now Southern Nigeria and 
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in Ireland the dismantlement of the Brehon legal structure removed women’s 
entitlement to land ownership, divorce and public office.65 
Not all authors are as explicit as Bluntschli. Not all were as misogynistic. The 
context in which these authors sexed the state is more complex than what may 
first appear and alternative narratives were possible. For instance, Phillimore, 
who was also a women’s rights advocate, is adamant in his argument that women 
had a role within international law and could represent the state, including 
possessing immunities, as ambassadors; a state cannot reasonably refuse to 
receive an ambassador on the grounds of sex.66 Margaret of Austria and Louisa 
of Savoy were both involved in the negotiation of treaties, and an ambassadress 
was sent by Henry IV to Constantinople — indeed, Phillimore stated that the 
first female diplomat, the Duchess of Orleans, negotiated as Plenipotentiary the 
Treaty between France and England.67  
In stark contrast, Bluntschli argues that ‘[w]omen who have been famous in 
politics have generally done harm to the State and their friends’.68 Phillimore 
found women engaging in international law acceptable, others disdaining their 
presence altogether. 
Nonetheless, Phillimore’s language choices also betray an understanding of 
statehood which allies itself with stereotypical male attributes: 
the individual man should attain to the full development of his faculties through 
his intercourse with other men … so it is divinely appointed that each individual 
society should reach that degree of perfection of which it is capable, through its 
intercourse with other societies … is as much the normal condition of a single 
nation, as to live in a social state is the normal condition of a single man.69 
He continues, switching genders, that  
when a new State springs into being, and demands to be admitted into the great 
Commonwealth of States, International Law requires that her political status be so 
far considered by other States, as to satisfy them that she is capable of discharging 
international obligations.70  
Here, Phillimore aligns the female pronoun not with the divinely appointed 
position of the male state reaching its point of perfection. Allying femininity 
with the ‘new’ state that must, as yet, prove her worth rather than possessing a 
‘normal’ position as a matter of right.71 The male state represents the natural 
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order of social states, while the female state, not possessing this pre-ordained 
position, before admittance, must be adjudged by the Commonwealth to be 
capable of acting as they do and executing her obligations before gaining her 
rights. New states by being female are not yet fully capable of being members of 
the Commonwealth or, perhaps, as is more commonly articulated in the Statute 
of the Permanent Court of International Justice and the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, must prove they are amongst the civilised 
nations.72 
Bluntschli defines the state in masculine terms:  
— the State is a combination or association (Gesammtheit) of men, in the form of 
government and governed, on a definite territory, united together into a moral 
organised masculine personality; or, more shortly, — the State is the politically 
organised national person of a definite country.73  
Such personification asks the reader to associate particular masculine 
stereotypes with specific attributes of government. The masculine state, just as 
the male body is bounded and not subject to childbirth or penetration, does not 
allow for emissions or entries being in complete control of its borders and 
governance. The state is also a moral fraternity whose structure forms part of the 
natural order. Bluntschli links his definition to an organismic view of statehood 
in both domestic and international law; ‘[t]he recognition of the personality of 
the State is thus not less indispensable for Public Law (Statsrecht) than for 
International Law (Völkerrecht)’.74 These definitions idealise the nation state as 
having a set of characteristics reminiscent of the Montevideo Convention 
definition of statehood, which would thereafter become customary international 
law, a fixed border and population, control of internal and external affairs. As 
Carty observes, in the writings of this era only weak states betray ‘womanish 
fears’.75 
Bluntschli links independent and ordered government to masculinity while 
connecting feminine qualities to a lack of governance and dependence:  
Strictly speaking, only those peoples in which the manly qualities, understanding 
and courage, predominate are fully capable of creating and maintaining a national 
State. Peoples of more feminine characteristics are, in the end, always governed 
by other and superior forces.76  
Bluntschli suggests that states can progress toward masculine, or regress 
toward feminine, attributes but there are also peoples who are wholly incapable 
of ever developing masculinised governance and that this, as well as being part 
of the inevitable order of things, is a basis for imperialism. These peoples are, as 
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feminine, underdeveloped and will forever lack the virtues we ascribe to the 
mature man and civilised state. 
The masculinity of the internal state and the external replication and 
representation of such masculine characteristics are common themes. Lorimer 
argues that for international law there is a particular governance trajectory: 
When contrasted with other branches of jurisprudence, there are several points of 
view in which the law of nations may be regarded as modern. There were not only 
men and families but there are unions of families into clans and tribes, bound 
together with ties of blood … and neighbourhood before there were those 
ethnological and geographical combinations which we call nations.77 
Lorimer reaches back to a mythical era, a typical strategy of 19th century 
nationalism, which interlinks the natural male headed household as at the core of 
the operative state.78 Robert Lansing, writing in the first edition of the American 
Journal of International Law in 1907, makes a similar point by stating that the 
‘inherent weakness of woman is still recognized in the states of the world, and 
the possession of sovereignty is deemed today a masculine prerogative just as it 
has been for thousands of years’.79 Part of the colonising method was to remove 
women from governance so as to more fully resemble the Western male 
governance order. Lorimer ties the modern state to the possession of full internal 
control as masculinised governance. 
Bluntschli aligns this perspective with the Church’s role in the state: 
The French expression, L’état c’est l’homme, does not merely signify ‘the State is 
Man in general’ (der Mensch im Groszen), but ‘the State is the man, the husband 
(der Mann) in general’ as the Church represents the womanly nature in general, 
the wife (die Frau) … The highest conception of the State — which however has 
not yet been realised — is thus: The State is humanity organised, but humanity as 
masculine, not as feminine, the State is the man.80 
Although Warner argues that too much can be read into the evolution of 
gendered nouns, Bluntschli clearly regards his use of pronouns as central to 
understanding the roles of the state and the Church and further that these 
pronouns offer guidance on how we ought to view international law.81 While 
there may be little consistency in linguistic terms to the gender of words in any 
language, Bluntschli and others believed it was significant in both their own 
writing and how they articulated the nature of statehood. 
Echoing Bluntschli, Westlake sets out the natural maleness of the state: 
The society of states, having European civilisation, or the international society, is 
the most comprehensive form of society among men, but it is among men that it 
exists. States are its immediate, men its ultimate members. The duties and rights 
of states are only the duties and rights of the men who compose them.82 
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While perhaps Westlake is using men in a generic sense, we must remember 
that when he was writing in 1894 women were yet to gain the vote at national 
level for legislatures (except in New Zealand), were excluded from public office 
and admitted to few universities and even then, often could not gain degrees.83 
Upon the foundation of the American Society of International Law in 1906 
women were forbidden from becoming members.84 The founders of the 
American Society of International Law were adamant that the impartiality and 
self-control necessary for the science of international law was entirely male.85 In 
this era, any idea that ‘men’ was a generic term that included both sexes was 
rejected by courts and legislatures. For instance, during the 1867 debate on 
women’s suffrage in the United Kingdom Parliament, an interpretation of ‘man’ 
as a generic term for both sexes was rejected.86 Indeed, as late as 1914 in Bebb v 
The Law Society, the UK Court of Appeal found that ‘persons’ in the Solicitors 
Act of 1843 was not intended to include women.87 As such, the generic in the 
19th century was male. 
Westlake often uses the female pronoun for states and, as with Phillimore, not 
always in a negative sense, albeit he still relies on gendered stereotypes. Indeed, 
Westlake was a supporter of married women’s property rights but argued that ‘it 
will always be necessary to preserve to the husband some degree of authority’.88 
Westlake’s description of the state is different to Bluntschli’s but both maintain 
that the composition of the state as male makes the state sovereign. Westlake is 
clear that the creation and maintenance of international law is firmly tied to 
constituent power within the state and, in particular, that consent within 
international law is linked to masculine society: 
[T]he social nature of man, and his material and moral surroundings … are the 
ultimate source of international law … And consent is the immediate source of 
international law, in the sense that the social nature of man and his material and 
moral surroundings may furnish principles of action, but only the consent of a 
society can establish rules.89 
Westlake takes this a step further, including himself and other international 
lawyers as central to international law’s composition, ‘[t]he opinions of private 
writers must of course be counted towards the general consent of men, especially 
when the writer’s reputation proves that he represents many persons besides 
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himself’.90 This is an early iteration of art 38(4) of the Statute of the Permanent 
Court of Justice and art 38(d) of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice.91 Certainly, he regards international legal academia as a fraternity whose 
masculine reasonability is mirrored both internally and externally by the state.92 
This notion of the fraternity of scholars is replicated elsewhere including in 
Pomeroy’s idea of the ‘brotherhood of nations’.93 The characteristics and 
symbolism connected to the international legal academic was established in the 
absence of women and in repetition of a process of exclusion of women from the 
public sphere of action that dates back to Greek philosophy.94 Homosociality is 
put at the core of international legal academia’s right to influence legal 
development.95 
Evident in these writings is the intermixing of civilisational views with 
gendered assumptions. In particular, a form of dualism, the civilised and non-
civilised mirroring the Western dichotomy of masculine and feminine.96 What 
becomes plain in these texts is the combination of the feminine as a negative 
characteristic linked to either weakness or failure to attain statehood and as a 
justification for imperialism. Those not reaching the highest echelons of 
civilisation are thus not first order states or states at all due to their feminine 
attributes: 
Alexander the Great … He wished to wed the manly spirit of the Greeks with the 
feminine quickness and susceptibility of the Asiatics. The East and the West were 
to be united and mingled together, and from the mingling of both, as in a cup of 
love, the new mankind was to issue … The mingling of diverse elements was 
unnatural, the leading idea itself was not clear.97 
Westlake intermixes his civilisational views of states with particular gendered 
assumptions, albeit he, unlike most of his contemporaries, is willing to admit 
China, Japan, Persia and Turkey as civilised states, though differently civilised to 
the US and Europe:98 
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The case of Turkey must in this part of our subject be left out of sight, because of 
the anomalous position of that empire, included on account of its geographical 
situation in the political system of Europe, but belonging in other respects rather 
to the second group of contrasted populations. She may benefit by European 
international law so far as it can be extended to her without ignoring plain facts, 
but her admission to that benefit cannot react on the statement of the law, which is 
what it is because it is the law of the European peoples.99 
This is echoed in Lorimer, who argues that ‘at the stage of civilisation which 
they have reached, their intercourse may best be conducted with a view to the 
attainment of their freedom as separate political entities’.100 But he also 
maintains that some groups will never attain this status; ‘[e]ven now the same 
rights and duties do not belong to savages and civilised men, and consequently, it 
not ignorance alone which prevents the former from discovering the law by 
which the rights and duties of the latter are defined’.101 
Lorimer sets forth that just as individuals within states are naturally unequal, 
women are not capable of being constituents, so too states:  
Even within the sphere of plenary political recognition, States are no more equal 
to each other, in the absolute sense, than their citizens are equal. They differ in 
powers, and consequently in rights, and the recognition which they are entitled to 
claim from each other is proportioned to their power and rights.102 
Further, he argues that states are ‘entitled to jural recognition by other States, 
just as a citizen in a corresponding position is entitled to the suffrage, or a person 
is entitled to buy, and to sell, and to marry’.103 This analogy relies upon an 
acceptance that as citizens women do not hold corresponding positions to men 
and are thus not as entitled to buy, sell and marry. Lorimer utilises gendered 
personification to note the difference between masculine and feminine 
characteristics and how these are manifested in juridical structures both 
internally and externally. In fulfilling the requirements of internal and external 
control, states must possess the juridical structures maintained by European 
states as a hallmark of Western civilisation. Just as gender inequality is a natural 
part of internal governance so too state inequality in external governance and 
thus inequality between states is to be expected. 
Koskenniemi suggests that by the time of publication of Lorimer’s work 
divisions between civilised and uncivilised states were considered crude, but 
Bluntschli and others continued to employ similar tropes and divisions well into 
the start of the 20th century.104 Combined with this civilisational view is a 
disregard for women, due to their lack of rationality and reasonability, as not 
possessing the agency necessary for competent government. Groups holding, or 
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purporting to hold, feminine stereotypical attributes, would never reach the 
juridical status of statehood as their feminised governance was innately 
uncivilised. There is variance amongst these authors. Phillimore was, for 
example, willing to recognise the potential for women ambassadors, quite a 
radical claim given that the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office did not 
admit women until the 1950s.105 Nonetheless, though the degree of racism and 
misogyny varies there remains a clear link between masculinity and statehood 
and femininity and the incapacity to fulfil the characteristics of the state. 
Misogyny and racism go well beyond Lorimer and are clearly evident among his 
‘liberal’ fellow international law professionals who founded modern 
international law.106 Explicit reliance on Lorimer is now rightly regarded as 
highly problematic and, as this section demonstrates, his fellow travellers also 
grounded their views of international law and statehood in sexism and racism. 
V PERSONIFICATION AND THE STATE BEYOND LAW 
If personification aims to produce a particular reaction in its audience, then 
what is the purpose of using it regarding the state? What has been the effect of 
personification and the admixture of masculine or feminine traits upon our 
understanding of the state’s internal constitutional structure and its external 
actions?107 Personification is not a single process, each invocation varies the 
attributes singled out impacting on our view of the object.108 Focusing on the 
legal text alone obscures the context in which 19th century personifications were 
invoked. The context in which a pronoun is sexed, independent of its linguistic 
heritage, is significant. The following section sets out how identity, sex, gender 
and governance were regarded while these first modern international lawyers 
were creating the groundings for their profession and international law. 
Politics is mediated by ‘systems of cultural representation’.109 Cynthia 
Weber’s identification of statecraft as ‘mancraft’ and the genderisation of 
sovereignty unsettles the accepted formalist and pervasive ideals of the state born 
in the 19th century.110 Identity and gender, in particular, are crucial to the 
conception of the modern nation and citizenship. As gender and power are 
intertwined, gender is also significant in how we understand relations amongst 
states.111 The nation state as it emerged into its contemporary international 
legalised form is equally suffused with identity and gender as that mediated by 
                                                 
 105 Helen McCarthy, Women of the World: The Rise of the Female Diplomat (Bloomsbury, 
2014) 228. 
 106 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Race, Hierarchy, International Law, Lorimer’s Legal Science’ (2016) 
27 European Journal of International Law 415, 415. 
 107 Stephen D Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton University Press, 1999) 
152. 
 108 Lakoff and Johnson, above n 34, 33. 
 109 Glenda Sluga, ‘Identity, Gender, and the History of European Nations and Nationalisms’ 
(1998) 4 Nations and Nationalism 87, 88, quoting Joan Landes ‘Representing the Body 
Politic: The Paradox of Gender in the Graphic Politics of the French Revolution’ in S 
Melzer and L Rabine (eds), Rebel Daughters: Women and the French Revolution (Cornell 
University Press, 1988) 2.  
 110 Cynthia Weber, Queer International Relations: Sovereignty, Sexuality and the Will to 
Knowledge (Oxford University Press, 2016) 21.  
 111 Joan W Scott, ‘Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis’ in Elizabeth Weed (ed), 
Coming to Terms: Feminism, Theory, Politics (Routledge, 1989) 81, 94. 
2018] Gendered Personifications of the State 19 
politics at the domestic level.112 Moira Gatens explains that ‘[p]erhaps the 
metaphor of the human body is an obvious way of describing political life; so 
obvious that the metaphor passes into common usage, no longer mindful of its 
origins’ that this practice has placed women at social and political 
disadvantages.113 This political life, however, is a ‘dream of men’ or male 
‘psychosis’ of which women and other groups were not part.114 Women did not 
possess what was required to participate fully in governance, as the parameters 
of the state had already been set by the masculine ideal.115 
The modern notion of the state as a person emerged in the writings of John 
Locke, Niccolò Machiavelli, Benedictus de Spinoza and Thomas Hobbes.116 The 
usage of the human body remains ubiquitous and no alternative metaphor has 
replaced it.117 The state did not exist without the prince and the prince did not 
exist without the state and, as such, man and state became intertwined as they 
took their modern form.118 Hobbes’ Leviathan is a superman who brings peace to 
individual men of whom he is composed. Hobbes, Spinoza and Locke used the 
human, as composed of soul and body, to symbolise the relationship between 
sovereign authority and citizens.119 For Spinoza, the duality of body and mind 
and that inter-relationship was fundamental to understanding reality.120 His 
rejection of the personification of God due to the miscomprehension that follows 
reinforces both the ramifications of personification and his decision to utilise the 
body in broader political discourse.121 
The notion of the state as a body, and critically as a European male body, 
appeared alongside the creation of national symbols such as flags and anthems or 
other ‘invented traditions’.122 Eric Hobsbawm argues that from 1740 ‘the 
personification of the “nation” in symbol or image, either official, as with 
Marianne and Germania, or unofficial, as in the cartoon stereotypes of John Bull, 
the lean Yankee Uncle Sam and the “German Michel”’ sat alongside other 
national symbols to morph into our perceptions of what has always existed as the 
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natural order.123 For instance, in the tumult of Jacobin France, radical forces of 
reaction and treachery were linked to ‘the disorder of women’, which, in turn, 
began a political and societal process of withdrawing women to the private 
sphere.124 Wars in Europe against the French Revolution and Napoleon were 
waged by invoking patriotism and morality both of which became central to 
emerging national consciousness.125 As part of this process, the activities of 
political women in the pre-revolutionary period were negatively depicted and the 
boundaries between public and private, between orders, genders and religions, 
which had been blurred, re-emerged.126 Glenda Sluga suggests that both those in 
favour and against the revolutionary ideals of France ‘prophesied and even 
diagnosed social revolution in the blurring of gender hierarchies. Any activity by 
women in public that challenged the gender “order” could be depicted as 
subversive’.127 Using the female form during the revolution was intended to 
demonstrate a break from the Kingdom of France which had often been depicted 
as a male figure. Thus, after the French Revolutionary period depictions of 
Marianne became unpopular.128 It was not until the mid-19th century that 
Marianne was revived, before falling out of favour after the Second Republic and 
returning again after the restoration of the Third Republic.129 
In the UK, following the French Revolution, drawing contrasts between 
patriotic English women as distinct from their revolutionary and unfeminine 
French counterparts was in turn linked to what made the UK strong and 
rational.130 George Mosse demonstrates a similar reaction in Germany to the 
forces of Napoleon that set the tone for a form of bourgeois respectability 
centred on a particular view of masculinity and nationalism which in the 20th 
century became an essential element of German national identity.131 The 
growing import of both the official character of the state as male is evident as is 
the notion that politically active females were subversive and would inevitably 
lead to revolution. Indeed, this seems to be borne out within international legal 
writing. Bluntschli argued that women in politics do harm and that the ‘history of 
Rome, the French Revolution, the courts of the French kings, all tell the same 
tale’.132 Westlake similarly asserted, regarding France’s denouement following 
the fall of Napoleon, that it ‘should be deprived of the immense conquests she 
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had made, and accordingly … the new boundary of France was fixed and she 
renounced all that lay beyond it, without saying to whom’.133 
19th century philosophers, across a broad spectrum, from Georg Wilhelm 
Friedrich Hegel to Giuseppe Mazzini, made the differentiation between the 
public and the private and the centrality of the family core elements of state 
organisation.134 As Genevieve Lloyd argues, ‘[t]he maleness of the Man of 
Reason … is no superficial linguistic bias’, and the maleness of culture as 
opposed to the femaleness of nature, to which reason is opposed, is a central 
feature of Western philosophical thought.135 The 19th century emergence of the 
bourgeoisie classes and the differentiation between the public and private sphere 
are central elements of nationalist gender identity.136 Middle class values based 
upon family and individualism became the basis on which sexual difference and 
inequality became the foundation for participation in the public sphere.137 
Conservative societal perspectives underscored political action and was the 
impetus behind regarding the state as reliant upon masculine qualities of 
reasonability and independence, which became central to the perception of the 
state within international law. The male state takes the public role of responsible 
government, whereas women were left in the private sphere as is necessary for 
the patriotic state. 
The rise of nationalist propaganda in the 18th and 19th centuries created 
idealised notions of masculinity as at the core of both the nation and the state. 
Women, on the other hand, were shallow and frivolous but were also the 
guardians of continuity, respectability and the unchangeability of the state.138 
This is realised in the political cartoons of the time. For instance, in Punch, 
Hibernia is depicted as a virginal maiden, threatened by Fenians and other Irish 
radicals and sorely in need of rescue by paternal John Bull.139 What is peculiar to 
Hibernia’s character in these cartoons is her helplessness and passivity. Britannia 
is most frequently depicted as a warrior woman, often wearing a helmet and 
armour and linked to the figure of the charioted Boadicea.140 
Yet, these depictions are not a call to arms for women; rather they hark back 
to Athena born of Zeus, emerging from his forehead, emphasising the male line 
of succession. Such classical figures also invoke the Athenian polis, which 
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according to Peterson ‘exemplifies the gendered pattern of state-making’.141 
While the Amazonian state might suggest alternate classical invocations of 
women as rulers and warriors, their soldering was insufficient to regard them as 
rational actors and Amazonian governance structures were not accepted as part 
of the norm.142 Britannia and Germania are gendered feminine but ‘this 
iconography operates despite, or rather because of the actual experiences of their 
female populations’.143 John Bull represents the everyday active male citizen. 
Hibernia — which of course was part of the UK at this point — resonates with 
the imperialist preference of the era where the weak feminine state requires 
protection from its own barbarous population.144 
Athena is an armoured virgin whose sexless virtue sets her apart and whose 
armour renders invisible her sexual characteristics.145 Hibernia, as an 
unarmoured female, reflects women as they are perceived to be weak and in need 
of protection from Britannia, an armoured personification not of every-woman 
but of a virtuous armoured virgin free from the inadequacies of womanhood such 
as childbirth. While John Bull or Uncle Sam may represent the typical 
Englishman or American citizen, Britannia is not relatable, she is not a familiar 
citizen rather she represents something apart.146 Britannia is not a female role 
model of political activism, nor is she intended as a paradigm for women’s 
leadership: she, like Athena, on whom she is modelled, is rather a mythical, 
abstract ideal.147 Female personification represents civil and martial virtues but 
the active state is male.148 The UK, seemingly without contradiction, is both 
Britannia and John Bull. 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau identified the ‘disorder of women’ as bringing a state 
to ruin through their innate subversive nature and as apart from the natural state 
of men as rational actors.149 Rousseau placed patriarchal patriotism at the centre 
of both the new nation state and the citizen and the notion of fatherland was of 
particular import to his work as was the ideal of the Spartan mother who brings 
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sur les spectacles (first published 1758)].  
2018] Gendered Personifications of the State 23 
up her sons to die in battle. The willingness to serve and protect the motherland 
is predicated on a mother’s presence in bringing up the child to this civic virtue 
in the private family sphere.150 These gendered ideals of statehood and 
citizenship were central to his thinking of what the state ought to be.151 As Sluga 
argues: 
Rousseau suggested that it was only through the cultivation of familial interests in 
the image of the social order that patriotism, loyalty to a larger community, 
defined by the territorial boundaries of the state, could be assured. The state 
became the fatherland and the family the microcosm of society. In Rousseau’s 
schema the father’s place in the family was affirmed and consolidated by his 
public role … just as the female’s destiny as wife and mother defined both her 
domestic and national role.152 
The motherland forms part of homely belonging that is central to many 
national anthems.153 But here  
[t]he mother of the motherland is not any mother; she is certainly not a ‘working’ 
mother, for she is a totally ‘devoted’ mother ready to service those who need her. 
That is, she is a woman totally subjugated to the patriarchal rule of the father.154  
As such, motherland and fatherland are completely intertwined: 
It is because of the superposition of these two functions that popular language 
refers to this homeland/motherland as fatherland when it is its law and order … 
the ‘actual’ fatherland is the land … of governmental and sovereign belonging.155 
Patriotism only survives in the miniature fatherland, the home, when it is also 
the site of justice and order.156 But these invocations are not without their 
contradictions. 
There are few references to motherland or fatherland within international 
legal texts but, in the context of imperial or colonial expansionism, the treatment 
of states as childlike or developing is common.157 European states act as parents 
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offering both caring and nurturing aspects as mothers, but also the firm hand of 
fathers when discipline is necessary. The differing views of 19th century 
international lawyers toward Liberia, Japan or Turkey as states capable of at least 
passing as somewhat civilised, versus those territories where such progress 
toward maturity was impossible, stand as testament to the utilisation of parental 
imagery, which survived the creation of mandate and trust territories in the 20th 
century.158 
In the domestic sphere challenges from both feminism and socialism to the 
maleness of the state pushed against the dominant imagery of the 19th century. 
But the debate remained within the framework set by the male state.159 
Discussing John Stuart Mill and The Subjection of Women,160 Laura Mayhall 
argues  
[i]n order to elevate women to the sphere of the political, Mill must first render 
their oppression in masculine terms. Arguing by analogy, therefore, he [Mill] 
removes their oppression from the sphere of the merely domestic and offers them 
the possibility of exercising their own will. Women must assert the masculine 
characteristic of independence …161  
The suffragists also adopted masculine structures employing the language of 
emancipation utilised by the anti-slavery and labour movement.162 The 
constitutional jurist Albert Venn Dicey directly critiqued any attempt to 
appropriate this language, arguing that ‘the women of England cannot now be 
“emancipated”, for they have never been slaves … They cannot be emancipated, 
because they are born free, are free, and will remain free whether they obtain 
parliamentary votes or not’.163 Thus, as ever, in attempting to enter male 
discourse women articulated their political and social voicelessness within the 
male state structure. 
The intersectional nature of the harm produced in these texts is also apparent. 
All women, alongside all other non-white males, were not rational or mature 
enough for governance and thus shared this space. While women, in what would 
become the Global North, were moving out of the private sphere through a 
variety of women’s movements, women living in so-called feminine states were 
burdened not only with imperialism and its legacies but also a position in 
societies often dictated by Western constitutional models that excluded them and 
failed to acknowledge their agency — a process aided and supported by 
international law. 
Two points come to the fore. First, in the 19th century the state can only be 
supported by women acting according to their correct, virtuous feminine nature 
in the private sphere. Second, any breaking away from this role would lead to the 
breakdown on the state into revolution. Thus, the strong state, the state that lasts 
and remains above revolution, was the one that personified the masculine traits 
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of reasonability, strength, resolve and rationality.164 These were the states that 
succeed and are the exemplars of civilisation at its height. In doing so, gender 
difference became inculcated as part of national and state identity.165 
Nationalism and statehood became intertwined just as modern international law 
was taking form. Using personification to categorise states was of particular 
utility to European imperialist projects, making Eurocentric notions of statehood 
global and steadfast. 
VI IMPACT ON THE PRESENT 
Ghassan Hage writes that ‘nations, like any social reality, never reach a stage 
where they can just ‘exist’; they are not only constructions, but also continually 
in the making’.166 In this iterative process there is an ongoing need to revisit the 
language that describes states, to retell narratives and to ensure that the story’s 
culmination is a state able to withstand threats from outside or usurpation from 
within. Martin Clark demonstrates that the blatant civilisation language of the 
19th century simply morphed into other forms.167 Cynthia Weber aptly describes 
the ongoing relationship between underdeveloped, undevelopable and gender.168 
While challenges to the narrative of the bourgeois nation state, from within the 
municipal political and social realm, overturned elements of these constructions, 
we still tackle the remains of that discourse in international law.169 The 
personification of states as motherlands and fatherlands, as Britannia or Uncle 
Sam, as he or she and as children, predates the 19th century. But, it was in this 
period that international lawyers, to fit their often colonial, misogynist and 
imperialist world view, used personification to articulate the form that 
international law ought to take. Today, internal and external self-mastery, 
sovereignty as capacity for government, fatherland and recognition are at their 
purest as states seek recognition by the United Nations.170 But, this validation 
pre-dates the Charter, self-mastery as a characteristic of statehood was a pre-
eminent theme within 19th century international legal scholarship and while 
certain linguistic tropes have disappeared, others stay visible and their impact 
remains pungent. 
The 19th century personified state led to some of the 20th century’s most 
abhorrent moments, from fascism and totalitarianism to genocide.171 Conceiving 
the state as an organism (or personified collective) enabled ‘normative claims on 
behalf of state persons themselves, or as raison d’état’.172 In The Origins of 
Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt explains how, by such contrivances, criticism of 
one part of society or a single individual is criticism of the leadership of 
totalitarian states, as all formed the same collective organism.173 The devastating 
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consequences flowing from state personification explains why organismic state 
descriptions are rejected across most social sciences.174 The contribution by 19th 
century international lawyers’ proclivity for personification and organismic 
language to these 20th century outcomes may be indirect, but it equally cannot be 
overlooked. 
The influence of these legal academics on those that read their work is plain. 
For instance, Bluntschli had a long influence on both the practice and teaching of 
international law in Canada, Europe and the US.175 Woodrow Wilson studied 
Bluntschli and his study of international law affected his later views on the 
settlement that followed 1919 including the creation of new states.176 Oppenheim 
studied under Bluntschli.177 Bluntschli’s work was translated into French, 
Hungarian, Russian, Spanish and, demonstrating its spread, Chinese.178 A French 
jurist writing in 1885 stated that his work was ‘almost the only one which is 
today consulted by the diplomats and by all those obligated by their profession to 
possess some notion of international law’.179 His work became part of the 
Oxford syllabus (which was then taught across the UK) and influenced writers 
such as Elvin Jellinek and William Hall.180 
Today, these writers are still cited and quoted with approval across 
international law textbooks. The ‘primitivist’ view of the state, as at the centre of 
international law, pervades the contemporary discipline.181 For example, in 
Malcom Shaw’s International Law, Westlake is cited regarding territory, Hall 
concerning state practice and Phillimore in relation to the Permanent Court of 
International Justice and state jurisdiction.182 In James Crawford’s most recent 
edition of Brownlie’s Principles of International Law, Westlake is cited on the 
law of sea and the common law tradition within international law and Hall on 
statehood and territory.183 Antonio Cassese cites Bluntschli, Lorimer, Hall and 
Westlake.184 In Malcom D Evan’s International Law, these authors appear 
across several chapters.185 Bluntschli, Lorimer and Phillimore are mentioned by 
Stephen Neff in his history of international law, while in his chapter 
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Koskenniemi recognises the importance of Westlake to statehood.186 Lorimer 
and Westlake’s roles in setting out the terms of state recognition in the 1880–
1890s, its distillation and partial sanitisation through Oppenheim into the 1919 
Peace Conference and beyond is documented by Clark.187 Matthew Craven, 
singularly amongst these texts, takes a critical approach highlighting the impact 
of civilisational language, promulgated by Hall, Lorimer and Westlake. Their 
ideas, he notes, did not vanish but rather were remodelled and given 
institutionalised form in the League of Nations.188 
Koskenniemi suggests that: 
For a long time, Europe’s use of international law was determined from its 
position of overwhelming power. Vitoria was a scholar of empire and Bluntschli 
— the first to write about universal human rights in a manual on international law 
— dined with Bismarck. For these men, the fact that international law was both 
European and universal peaked in the practice of the mission civilisatrice of their 
particular country.189 
What is striking about Koskenniemi is that while he recognises international 
law’s imperialistic foundation, he fails to find these scholars problematic.190 
Bluntschli is commended for his universality and human rights, never mind that 
his universality was a fraternity where women were absent as juridical 
incompetents, incapable of acting as constituents and so too the states he 
believed resembled their sensitivities. Male universality and the ideal of the 
masculine state provided the basis of both Bluntschli and his contemporaries’ 
scholarship. Women were not present as constituents within the state and those 
states that had feminised attributes were not members of the international legal 
order. Lorimer is widely recognised as highly problematic but what is perhaps 
more inexcusable is that he tends to be presented as an outlier.191 Koskenniemi 
states that while ‘most of them were liberals of one or another sort … Lorimer 
espoused an openly racist ideology’.192 In fact, as the direct quotes in this piece 
demonstrate, their liberalism was based in racism and misogyny and they were 
just as open with it as Lorimer. 
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Woman as nation, or what Peterson describes as ‘heterosexist ideology’, 
underpins these texts: 
[E]xemplified when European colonizers used notions of bourgeois 
‘respectability’ (read: heteronormative, well-bred) to legitimate their domination 
of ‘Others’ and when any state power justifies foreign interventions as 
‘rescue/civilising missions’, ostensibly to ‘save’ women from oppression by their 
‘own’ men.193 
In the imperial context personifications transferred gendered structures 
beyond Europe, muting women on whom imperialism bared down. States 
categorised to possess feminine characteristics were incomplete making 
colonisation an imperative. Failure to account for the gendered context of the 
creation of modern statehood in these texts where half the population are 
silenced perpetuates their authority into the 21st century. 
The Montevideo Convention’s criteria on statehood are most often presented 
in contemporary textbooks as neutral qualities of statehood. Yet the permanent 
population, the defined territory, possession of a government and capacity to 
enter into relations with other states are demonstrated to be quite the opposite.194 
Each of these criteria operate upon a particular set of assumptions that, as Orford 
argues, has ‘no place for those portrayed as unruly, disordered, subversive, 
primitive or irrational’.195 To be a feminine state is to be incomplete.196 To 
function within international law, a state must cohere to these stereotypes and 
scholars demonstrate that such underlying assumptions continue to resonate. 
This piece demonstrates that this can be directly drawn from the work of 19th 
century scholars. 
Full-blown personifications in the 19th century form rarely appear but when 
they do they draw from the same socialised stereotypes. Gendered rhetoric is 
common in discussions of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ or humanitarian 
intervention. Paradigmatically invoked during the 2002 invasion of Afghanistan, 
it was replete with narratives of ‘muscular’ intervention in which the 
‘masculinised hero (the UN, NATO or the US) rescues the feminised developing 
state’.197 Before the first Gulf War, Kuwait was regularly depicted as a weak 
feminised state ravished by the predatory (male) state of Iraq and needing rescue 
by the virtuous masculine strength of Western forces.198 At the same time, Iraq 
was presented as having female traits: ‘being capricious, irrational and 
temperamental in contrast to the sober, calculated behaviour of the allies’.199 
Kuwait was a woman to be saved, and the deeply engrained image of the 
‘homeland as a female body whose violation by foreigners requires its citizens 
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and allies to rush to her defense’ is a powerful image.200 But it depended upon 
‘woman’ being received as a chaste, dutiful daughter or maternal figure. 
Conversely, Iraq was a woman to be chastised for acting outside the norm, 
whose actions granted a right to outsiders to invade both states.201 Prior to the 
bombing of Libya in 2011, descriptions of Gaddafi were fused with effeminate 
language; his Bedouin tents, his female bodyguards, even his dress all intended 
to create an image of irrationality and intemperance.202 In 2018, the US 
administration stated that ‘a century ago, civilized nations joined together’ to ban 
chemical weapons and they are once again sending their warriors out to save 
women and children from a Syrian monster incapable of taking care of its own 
people.203 Syria abdicating its role as caregiver and must be punished by the 
civilised warriors who banned weapons of their own creation. 
Charlesworth posits that 
[e]ntities of less than sovereign status that cannot assert control over a coherent 
unified territory, such as many indigenous minority peoples, do not qualify as full 
subjects and are at the margins of international law. This type of organised group 
is seen as having permeable, negotiable, penetrable, vulnerable boundaries in the 
same way that women’s bodies have been constructed in criminal law. Images of 
orderly national domestic spaces separated by state boundaries from exterior 
dangerous (female) chaos and anarchy …204 
Contradictory images, such as Iraq contemporaneously embodying 
undesirable male and female traits, might suggest that such analysis cannot be 
rooted in personification. But, as with Britannia and John Bull, apparent 
inconsistent gendering of states is coherent when we take account of the rationale 
of personification. Personification persuades us to consider a state in an entirely 
gendered context and whether it is idealised as Britannia as an abstract entity 
without political activity, the everyday women who is capricious and weak or the 
masculine state that is strong and vigorous, each is intended to obscure our 
vision of that state and what is lawful regarding it. International law enables the 
state to ward off unwanted interference and those states that cannot do so are 
unnatural.205 
Naffine proffers that ‘the principal concern of law is (the policing of the 
boundaries of) the bounded heterosexual male body. Bodies which are not like 
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this, or are not allowed to be like this, are somehow deviant and undeserving’.206 
Women’s bodies leak,207 while male bodies are ‘bounded, stable, and non-
permeable’,208 and both assumptions, with both their misogynist and 
homophobic attributes, have pervaded international law by regarding the state in 
its ideal form as impermeable.209 The legal criteria of statehood depend on 
isolation and separation to ensure a coherent, bounded state with one voice is 
established.210 While the notion of the single voice is contested, such critique 
does not trouble the legal test for statehood, which maintains the organismic 
links that resulted in such horrific harm in the 20th century. Although the terms of 
contemporary debate are perhaps not as crude as the 19th century writings, 
conceptualisations of the state change little. Gendered metaphors may have been 
removed from the textbooks, but the attributes ascribed by the 19th century texts 
to masculinity and femininity remain attached to the state and the scholars still 
cited with approval. 
19th century writers employed the masculine for fully engaged legal actors 
and the feminine to describe attributes of those countries whose status was less 
than civilised. This parallel would have been familiar within the state as the place 
of women as non-constituents existed throughout the American-Euro world. A 
feminine state was lesser, was not a constituent, was to be patronised and in 
many circumstances colonised. The concept of progression or regression of 
statehood is on a spectrum from feminine to masculine and now couched in the 
language of development and failed statehood, but the substance of the 
discussion remains the same. This is most obvious in how we define states but 
also, and following from this conception, on who may or may not sign treaties, 
how we recognise actors in international law and perhaps most obviously within 
international development law, what is developed and what is not developed or 
even more conspicuously what is least developed. Much of what is written about 
international law retains the state at its core and much of what is recognised as 
the legally legitimate exercises of power comes from this source. This fixation 
upon statehood in international law obscures other sites of decision-making. The 
strong, bounded, reasonable state possessing internal and external control of 
power still forms the core of most international law textbooks, which continues 
to have a negative impact upon women throughout the world today. The roots of 
this problem, as this article demonstrates, lie in the 19th century authors of 
international law textbooks on which most modern articulations of statehood 
remain reliant for original inspiration. These textbooks entrenched 19th century 
attitudes towards women into international language and structures and their 
ongoing influence must then be seriously reflected upon. 
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The legacies of these authors are twofold; on our conception of the state and 
on international legal academia. The former allows imperialism and misogyny to 
flourish, the latter perpetuates this harm and makes idols of men who may have 
founded our societies, journals and textbooks but whose bequests are damaging 
to both international legal academia and those whom international law 
subjugates. 
VII CONCLUSION 
The Venerable Bede suggested that metaphor is ‘a genus of which all the 
other tropes are species’.211 Metaphor and more specifically personification lie at 
the heart of language, guiding its audience’s thoughts. It would be easy to 
dismiss the authors who revelled in personification as distant and ‘forget’ their 
contribution to the field, as Kennedy suggests we have, but as he also 
demonstrates, we stay reliant upon them.212 Koskenniemi treats these academics, 
with the odd exception, as worthy forefathers whose legacies to both the 
profession and substantive law are invaluable.213 The present narrative on the 
international legal profession rarely stands ready to disown its forefathers beyond 
acknowledging some racist terminology.214 This is inadequate. 
This article instead insists that 19th century gendered personifications impacts 
on how we understand statehood and that we must add a feminist critique to the 
existing work on the imperial and racist legacies of this era. Analysing both how 
personifications reflect upon the time in which they were written and the 
influence of such writing today, this article entreats us to stop exalting the role of 
19th century legal academia in shaping our current (apparently neutral) 
international law. International legal personification in the 19th century reflects 
the conservative imperialist era in which it was written, but the extent of these 
authors’ misogyny and racism was neither inevitable nor can be explained as 
being of an era as the gradation amongst the writers’ attests. 
Understanding how preconceptions of gender were adopted into statehood 
personification guides us through the terminological choices of the 19th century 
and sheds light on that scholarship’s bequests. Connections between nation state-
building and imperialism in the 19th century found its full form within 
international law textbooks and their use of personification brought gender, as a 
key descriptor, into this mix. The establishment of fixed ideas revolving around 
the character of a state as containing masculine attributes such as independence, 
resolve and reasonability informed how we now perceive the contemporary state. 
Further seeing states as weak, irrational, immature or lacking full legal capacity 
enables us to find the solution in masculine leadership from the Global North. 
Some authors may not have entirely ostracised women from their discourse on 
international law, but taken as a whole, these texts have a clear misogynist voice. 
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TWAIL shows the ongoing ramifications of these writing for the Global South, 
while feminist critique proves that contemporary international law is often 
antithetical to women’s interests. This article proves that 19th century 
international legal academics, in setting the terms of how statehood is both 
described and adduced, incorporated this antithetical role into international law. 
Current scholarship must be vigilant when either creating idols of these writers 
or uncritically following the forms of scholarship these men passed down. 
